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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL AVIATION DEFINED
G ENERAL AVIATION is defined as all private-sector avia-
tion that does not involve regularly scheduled passen-
ger traffic.' General aviation includes business aviation, air
cargo, flight training, pleasure flying, agricultural aerial ap-
plication, air taxi and air charter, aerial law enforcement,
air ambulance service, and countless other aviation activi-
ties that do not fall under the auspices of scheduled
airlines.2
The general aviation industry includes manufacturers of
general aviation aircraft, major aircraft components (such
as engines and propellers), and smaller components. The
American general aviation industry once employed hun-
dreds of thousands of workers in dozens of states who pro-
duced tens of thousands of aircraft annually for use in this
country and around the world.3
During the 1980s tort lawsuits decimated the general avi-
ation industry.4 Employment dropped by sixty-five per-
cent.5 Major manufacturers closed plants, filed bankruptcy,
and all but halted production.6 Of all segments of the
American economy adversely effected by the tort litigation
IRobert Martin, General Aviation Manufacturing: An Industry Under Siege, in THE
LIITm MAZE 478, 478 (Peter W. Huber & Robert Litan eds., (1991)).
2 Id.
3 Russell W. Meyer, Statute of Repose - Key to Industry Future, GENERAL AVIATION
MFG. ASS'N INDUs. REv.: 1994 OUTLOOK AND AGENDA 1 (Feb. 9, 1994). More than
100,000 jobs have been lost in general aviation manufacturing, service, mainte-
nance, and related industries during the past 10 years. Id. Employment of United
States piston engine manufacturers alone has declined 78% since 1978. Id.
I See, e.g., The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993: Hearings on H.R. 3087
Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transp., 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (statement of Edward W. Stimpson, President General Avia-
tion Manufacturers Association), in THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION AcT OF
1993 at 4-7 [hereinafter House Hearings].
5 Meyer, supra note 3, at 1.
6 Id. Cessna closed its single engine aircraft production lines in 1986 based solely
on a perceived unlimited exposure to litigation. Id.; see also House Hearings, supra
note 4 (statement of Charles Suma, President and CEO, Piper Aircraft Corp.).
Although products liability was not the only reason Piper filed bankruptcy in July,
1991, the uninsured posture the company assumed due to the cost of liability insur-
ance rendered the company unfundable through traditional financing sources.
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explosion, the Brookings Institute cited general aviation as
the segment hardest hit.
7
B. AN INTRODUCTION TO TORT REFORM
Modern products liability lawsuits emerged due to drastic
changes in American tort law that first took root in the mid-
1960s, evolved and gained acceptance in the 1970s, and
constituted the law of the land by the 1980s.8 Concepts
such as strict products liability, punitive and emotional
damages, and joint and several liability mushroomed in
popularity and acceptance. 9 The evolution of these legal
devices was fueled by the intellectual appeal of their under-
lying tenets. The jurists, legislators, and legal scholars lead-
ing the fight for expanding tort law saw such devices as
tools for social improvement, through which industry
would bear the costs of injury to consumers regardless of
fault 10 and defendants would be punished for consciously
indifferent or grossly negligent treatment of consumers. 1
Martin, supra note 1, at 478-99. By 1986, Beech shut down most of its light airplane
production lines. Id. at 484.
See generally Martin, supra note 1, at 478-99.
a See generallyJames A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Will a New Restatement
Help Settle Troubled Waters: Reflections, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1257, 1257-61 (1993); Rich-
ard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14J. OF LEGAL STUD. 645, 645-
46 (1985).
9 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 1, at 480-83; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 8, at
1257-61. Strict products liability was an outgrowth of a number of legal develop-
ments during the early 1960s. Professor William Prosser authored Section 402A of
the Second Restatement of Torts in 1963, which revolutionized the concept of strict
liability. Contemporaneously, a number of landmark cases from jurisdictions such
as California and New Jersey abandoned previously held privity requirements for
products liability actions and adopted Professor Prosser's concepts of strict liability
in tort. Id.
10 See AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCrS LILAILrrY § 1:4, at 17-18 (Timothy E. Travers et
al. eds., 3d ed. 1987). The purpose of imposing strict liability on manufacturers is to
ensure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers who market such products rather than by injured persons. Id. Prod-
ucts liability, including strict liability, grew out of a public policyjudgment that con-
sumers required more protection than that offered by traditional legal concepts
such as negligence and breach of warranty. Id.
1 SeeJustice Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited Tort Reform: Allocation of Puni-
tive Damage Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REv. 61, 69-70 (1992). Punitive
damages serve to punish behavior that society condemns, but which is not criminal.
Id. While punitive damages have existed as a legal concept for centuries, punitive
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As a result of such social engineering, proponents envi-
sioned accelerated innovation and increased safety for the
general public, as well as a more equitable distribution of
costs associated with product use. 12
By the mid-1980s, tort reform became a buzzword of na-
tional political debate.1 3 Concerns developed that "the new
tort law" had abandoned such time-honored legal concepts
as fault-based liability, minimum evidence levels to prove li-
ability, and quantifiable measures of damages. As the econ-
omy initially felt the effects of the new tort law, an
increasing segment of the legal, industrial, and political
communities worried that ever expanding tort law would
cripple industry after industry, stifle innovation, discourage
safety improvements, and price new safer consumer goods
out of the reach of average consumers.14
In response to such concerns, tort reform efforts were
conceived and debated at both the state and national level.
damage awards were rarely assessed, and were usually small in amount as recently as
thirty years ago. Id. at 62-69; see TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S.
Ct. 2711, 2742 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
12 See Martin, supra note 1, at 492. If imposition of strict liability against manufac-
turers of general aviation airplanes would effectively deter accident-causing behavior
by encouraging innovation and product improvement, then years of vigorous en-
forcement should have produced benefits in the safety of general aviation. Another
historical justification for the expansion of products liability has been the perceived
availability of insurance in voluntary markets to fund additional losses that might be
imposed on manufacturers. Id.; see also Epstein, supra note 8, at 646.
13 Sharon G. Burrows, Note, Apportioning a Piece of a Punitive Damage Award to the
State: Can State Extraction Statutes be Reconciled with Punitive Damages Goals and the Tak-
ings Clause, 47 U. MiAMI L. REv. 437, 437-38 (1992). An apparent dramatic increase
in the number and dollar amount of punitive damage awards over the last several
decades has fueled a debate over the propriety of allowing punitive damages. Id.;
see alsoJennifer H. Arlen, Compensation Systems and Efficient Deterrence, 52 MD. L. Rv.
1093, 1093 (1993). Legal scholars and legislators are increasingly interested in alter-
natives to the tort system. Id.
14 Id. Most agree that the tort system seriously needs reformation. Victims often
cannot afford the time or expense associated with pursuing claims, successful plain-
tiffs may be undercompensated, and potential defendants suffer from crushing lia-
bility, much of which goes to administrative costs including attorneys' fees rather
than to victims. Id.; see alsoJohn A. Goerdt, Civil Justice Reform Model State Amendments:
How Will They Affect State Courts?, STATE CT. J. 14 (Winter 1993). The report of the
President's Council on Competitiveness suggests that tort reform is needed based on
the tremendous costs of the American civil justice system, which constitute a signifi-
cantly larger percentage of the United States gross national product than do litiga-
tion costs in other industrialized countries. Id.
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Common tort reform concepts include: limiting or elimi-
nating punitive damages or redirecting such damages to
the state; raising the degree of proof necessary to establish
strict liability or entitlement to punitive damages; restrict-
ing or prohibiting contingency attorney fee contracts and
contingency litigation expense contracts; and assessing the
cost of successfully defending such lawsuits to the plaintiff
or plaintiff's attorneys. 15
A number of state legislatures and courts have imple-
mented tort reform measures.1 6 Throughout the 1980s,
national tort reform was hotly debated and legislators intro-
duced various omnibus tort reform bills in Congress.17
None of these comprehensive measures were passed, how-
ever, and despite the level of debate, very few tort reform
efforts achieved success on a national level.18
C. TORT REFORM FOR GENERAL AVIATION
In the 1990s, a growing number of congressional mem-
bers directed their tort reform efforts toward rescuing the
general aviation industry. 9 Legislators have introduced a
number of ambitious bills designed to help general aviation
and then have watched their bills die at the committee
level.2 0 In the summer of 1994, however, congressional pro-
ponents of tort reform did succeed in passing a modest stat-
15 Id. at 14-17 (summarizing tort reform proposals contained in the 1991 report of
the President's Council on Competitiveness and predicting impact of each on the
civil justice system).
16 Shores, supra note 11, at 96-142. Justice Shores included a summary of tort
reform measures passed in each state as an appendix to her article. Id.
'7 See, e.g., Product Liability Fairness Act, S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Phil
Boyer, President's Position: There Is Hope For Liability Reform, AOPA PILOT, Dec. 1993, at
6. Aviation associations supported various bills proposing sweeping changes in tort
law that languished in both houses of Congress over the years. Id.
18 See, e.g., Shores, supra note 11, at 70-84 (stating the view of punitive damage
proponents during the 1980s tort reform debate); see also Teresa Moran Schwartz,
Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1335, 1336-39 (1993) (dis-
cussing various comprehensive federal tort reform proposals).
"I See Boyer, supra note 17, at 6 (describing efforts by certain members of Con-
gress to secure passage of tort reform for general aviation).
20 See Boyer, supra note 17, at 6; see also S. 67, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 645,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
TORT REFORM
ute of repose for general aviation products.2 1 After
eighteen years from the date of manufacture, the maker of
a general aviation product can not be held liable for negli-
gence or strict products liability claims arising from the
product.22
In many respects, the general aviation industry provides
an ideal laboratory for tort reform. Few industries are in
such dire need of tort reform.23  Few consumer groups of-
fer such overwhelming support for tort reform.2 4 Tort re-
form concepts ranging from the new national statute of
repose to more ambitious ideas, such as punitive damage
redirection, could be tested on the relatively small scale af-
forded by the general aviation industry. If tort reform fails
in the general aviation industry context, flaws could be
demonstrated without affecting a large percentage of the
general population. But, if tort reform works for general
aviation, successful elements could then be adapted to
other segments of the economy.
D. GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY BACKGROUND
In the late 1970s, the American general aviation industry
served as a model to the world. The industry produced reli-
able, affordable light aircraft, which in turn provided an un-
equalled spring board to aviation, technical, mechanical,
21 See General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (Pub. L.
No. 103-298) (West 1994) [hereinafter The Revitalization Act]. The Revitalization
Act, which was signed into law on August 17, 1994, appears as Appendix I to this
article. The Act is discussed infra at notes 115-133 and accompanying text.
22 Id.
2- See generally Martin, supra note 1, at 478-99.
24 See Phil Boyer, President's Position: Landing Liability Reform, AOPA PILOT, May
1994, at 2 (stating that 92% of members of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Associa-
tion, the largest general aviation consumer group, support statute of repose legisla-
tion for general aviation); see also General Aviation Liability Standards Act of 1989:
Hearings on S. 640 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate
Comm. on theJudiciayy, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (statement of John S. Yodice,
General Counsel, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association) [hereinafter Yodice]. The
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association and the Experimental Aircraft Association,
another major general aviation consumer group, both support products liability re-
form for general aviation. Id.
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and travel industry careers worldwide. 25  The dream of
flight was a realizable goal for most Americans thanks to the
general aviation industry.
E. THE RoLE OF GENERAL AVIATION IN THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY
In many ways, the general aviation industry developed as
a typical American industry. The manufacturing and mar-
keting of general aviation products emulated auto produc-
tion in many respects. Small companies founded by
entrepreneurs grew to multi-production plant enterprises
using components manufactured by smaller companies. 26
At their zenith, however, general aviation manufacturers
never reached the size of the major auto makers, or even
the commercial and military aircraft makers.
Unlike the average consumer product, the design and
production of light aircraft was always subject to the same
type of stringent federal regulation that applies to commer-
cial aircraft production. 2  This regulatory scheme does not
25 See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 3. Between 1965 and 1982, Cessna alone produced
an average of 6,500 piston engined aircraft per year. In 1981, Cessna alone em-
ployed almost 15,000 workers. Id.
26 See, e.g., BiLL CLARm, THE CESSNA 172 2-11 (2d ed. 1993).
27 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text (describing growth of general avia-
tion industry).
See 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1) (1988). 49 U.S.C. § 1421 provides that:
The Secretary of Transportation is empowered and it shall be his duty
to promote safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescrib-
ing and revising from time to time... [s]uch minimum standards gov-
erning the design, materials, workmanship, construction, and
performance of aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers as may be re-
quired in the interest of safety....
Id.
The development and production of any type of aircraft is one of the most closely
regulated American industries. See Martin, supra note 1, at 488. Most of the cost
related to FAA oversight and regulation of design, testing, production, and certifica-
tion of airplanes is borne by the aircraft manufacturers. Id.
A general aviation manufacturer would have to spend approximately $50 million
to meet FAA requirements for type certification to design, build, test, and certify an
entirely new four-passenger, single-engine airplane. Production line and inventory
costs would also amount to approximately $50 million. Id.
540
1994-1995] TORT REFORM
stop when an airplane leaves the production plant, but in-
stead continues throughout the life of the product.2 9
Finally, despite its ailing state, general aviation continues
to play a major role in our nation's transportation system.
General aviation aircraft fly over 30 million hours annually,
carrying 120 million passengers over 4 billion miles.3 0 Gen-
eral aviation provides the exclusive means of air transporta-
tion for over 5,000 communities. 31
F. THE HEALTH AND PERFORMANCE OF THE GENERAL
AVIATION INDUSTRY PRIOR TO THE TORT
ONSLAUGHT
Perhaps the archetypical general aviation product is the
Cessna 172 Skyhawk. The Skyhawk is a single-piston en-
gine, four-seat airplane. 2 First built in 1955, more
Skyhawks have been produced than any other airplane ever
made.3 The Skyhawk is also one of the safest light aircraft
ever built.3 4  In 1979, a new Skyhawk cost $22,300.31 In
29 Martin, supra note 1, at 488. If the FAA questions regulatory compliance of an
existing general aviation product, the manufacturer must develop and supply any
information the FAA requires to support the product and its compliance with FAA
standards and regulations. Id
s" See Meyer, supra note 3, at 8. General aviation aircraft fly almost four times the
annual airline flight hours. Id.
SI Id.
22 CLARKE, supra note 26, at 5, 8. When initially introduced in the 1950s, the
Cessna 172 was unique because it was one of the first general aviation aircraft to
employ a nose wheel design. The Cessna 172 was also one of the earlier general
aviation aircraft constructed entirely out of metal. During its lengthy production
run, the Skyhawk has been powered by a variety of Continental and Lycoming four
and six cylinder piston engines, producing from 145 to 195 horsepower. The
Skyhawk is small and simple enough to make an excellent basic flight training and
instrument flight training aircraft, yet is versatile, serving in probably every general
commercial general aviation application. Because it was produced in such large
numbers, the Skyhawk is still a primary aircraft used to train new pilots, and is the
aircraft of choice for many general aviation pilots.
" See Barry Schiff, Testpilog, AOPA PILOT, Aug. 1994, at 154, 164. Cessna pro-
duced 33,629 Skyhawks. The only aircraft of any type produced in greater numbers
was the Messerschmitt BF 109. Nazi Germany produced almost 35,000 BF 109s (a
fighter aircraft) before and during World War II.
34 CLARKE, supra note 26, at 239-44. The National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) publishes figures showing frequency of accidents for various types of aircraft
categorized by cause of accident. These categories include engine failures, in-flight
airframe failures, stalls, hard landings, ground loops, landing undershoots, and
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1978, American manufacturers produced 14,389 single-en-
gine aircraft,36 including 2,023 Skyhawks manufactured by
Cessna.
II. TORT LAWSUITS RUN AMOK
During the 1980s and early 1990s, a rash of tort lawsuits
based on wildly improbable factual backgrounds plagued
the general aviation industry.38 Although judgments were
entered against manufacturers in relatively few cases, many
of the suits filed were, characterized by such a surrealistic,
lottery-like quality that they strained the furthest bounds of
legal reason. Such cases give credence to the ever-present
industry fear of seven, eight, and nine digit emotional dis-
tress and punitive damage awards. The following cases
present just a few examples of the decisions that have
plagued general aviation.
A. CzWLAND V. PPER 9
A glider operator at a small, suburban airport used a
Piper Super Cub to tow gliders.40 The glider company be-
came involved in a dispute with the airport operator, which
forbade continued use of the airport for glider opera-
tions.41 To enforce the ban, the airport owner parked a van
on the runway.42 Despite the ban, Cleveland, an employee
of the glider, operator, planned to use the Super Cub to
landing overshoots. The Skyhawk had the lowest, or among the lowest, accidents
per 100,000 flight hours for each category. Id.
s Id. at 25.
- GENERAL AVIATION Mnt. Ass'N, GENERAL AVIATIoN STATISTICAL DATABOOK 6
(1993 ed.).
37 CLARKE, supra note 26, at 27-28.
2" See infra notes 39-68 and accompanying text.
39 See Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 291 (1993); Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 890 F.2d 1540 (10th Cir. 1989);
Shari L. Pitko, Comment, Aviation Law: Preemption of State Law Tort Claims by the
Federal Aviation Act - Do State Law Tort Claims Survive the Attack?, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 234
(1993).
- Cleveland, 890 F.2d at 1541-42.
41 Id. at 1542.
42 Id.
make a film while towing a glider aloft.43 Cleveland and a
mechanic removed the front seat from the two-seat Cub
and installed a wooden bench and camera mount, which he
built for the camera and photographer." The pilot and the
photographer boarded the aircraft and, despite seeing the
parked van on the runway, proceeded to attempt takeoff.
The results were predictably tragic. The Super Cub col-
lided with the van, and Cleveland struck his head on the
camera, which resulted in severe injury.45
Cleveland's wife sued Piper on Cleveland's behalf, alleg-
ing design defects, including lack of crashworthiness (no
rear seat shoulder harness) and lack of forward visibility
(the airplane employed a tail wheel design) .46 Despite the
pilot's obvious modification of the plane and negligent op-
eration, the jury awarded the plaintiff $2.5 million.47 The
jury concluded the Super Cub, versions of which had been
certified airworthy and in production for over forty years,
was defective. 48 Piper was unsuccessful in its attempt to vin-
dicate the federally approved design in appeals all the way
to the United States Supreme Court despite amicus curiae




4- Cleveland, 890 F.2d at 1542.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1543-45. The trial court submitted the case to the jury under design
negligence and crashworthiness negligence theories. The design negligence theory
referred to allegations that Piper designed the Super Cub with inadequate forward
visibility and, when submitted to the jury, this negligence was compared with that of
Cleveland, the airport owner who parked the van on the runway, and the mechanic
who assisted Cleveland in modifying the Super Cub. The crashworthiness negli-
gence issue limited the jury to comparing the alleged negligence of Piper in failing
to include a rear seat shoulder harness with the negligence of Cleveland. When this
case was first appealed to the Tenth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit remanded in part on
the basis that this form of submission was erroneous under New Mexico law and that
the negligence of all tortfeasors should have been submitted comparatively, regard-
less of whether design or crashworthiness negligence was at issue. Cleveland, 890
F.2d at 1546.
48 See Pitko, supra note 39, at 235. The first version of the Piper Cub was pro-
duced in 1937. A type certificate for the Super Cub was issued by the Civil Aeronau-
tics Administration in 1949, and the Super Cub is still in production today. Id.
49 Cleveland, 114 S. Ct. at 291. The May 1986jury verdict awarded Cleveland $2.5
million. The trial court reduced the award to $1,042,500 plus post judgment inter-
1994-1995] TORT REFORM 543
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B. DA 7SKOW V 7ELEDYAE OCOINENTAL MOTORS 50
A family of four was killed in a Beechcraft Debonair while
the pilot was making an instrument approach at night in
bad weather.5 ' The National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) investigated the accident and concluded that: no
fire existed on board prior to the crash, the engine was
working properly prior to the crash, and the crash was the
result of pilot error.5 2
Despite these conclusions, the family's survivors filed suit
against Teledyne Continental Motors, the manufacturer of
the Beechcraft's engine, alleging that the engine was defec-
tive.13  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that gasoline es-
caped from an engine nozzle and started an in-flight fire,
which, in turn, caused the crash.54 Although the plaintiffs
had no direct evidence to support their theory, the jury
awarded the plaintiffs $107 million in actual pain and suf-
est and costs. Cleveland, 890 F.2d at 1543-44. Piper appealed the judgment and the
court of appeals determined that comparative causation had been improperly sub-
mitted to the jury. The case was remanded for a new trial. Id. at 1546. Piper
amended its answer to assert a defense that state common law was preempted by the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and related regulations. The district court denied
Piper's motion for summary judgment on that defense. Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1440.
The trial court also ruled that the subsequent trial would only involve issues of liabil-
ity, the damages issues would not be retried, and Piper could not designate six wit-
nesses who had not testified in the earlier trial. Id. Piper appealed these pre-trial
rulings. Id.
The Tenth Circuit held the Federal Aviation Act does not preempt state common
law regarding aircraft design and safety, and remanded the case for reconsideration
of the trial court's decision to bar Piper from calling new witnesses at the re-trial of
this case, ruling that the new trial should involve both issues of liability and damages.
Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1442, 1447-50.
Piper, along with amici curiae including the United States, the General Aviation
Manufacturers Association, and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, ap-
pealed the Tenth Circuit's ruling to the United States Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court denied writ of certiorari on the matter. Cleveland, 114 S. Ct. at 291.
50 Datskow v. Teledyne Continental Motors Aircraft Prods., 826 F. Supp. 677
(W.D.N.Y. 1993); see Liability Reform for General Aviation: A Need at the Point of Crisis,
GENERAL AVIATION MFR. ASS'N, at 8 [hereinafter Liability Reform]; see also Product
Liability Case Settled Out of Court, AOPA PILoT, Feb. 1994, at 36.





fering damages.5 The trial court reduced the award to $1.1
million, and the case was subsequently settled for $1.4
million. 6
C. GuARNE , HAPER & CNNULI V. CESSNA
A pilot lost control of a Cessna during takeoff and
crashed. 7 The plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the pilot's
seat slipped during takeoff.5 8 All physical evidence indi-
cated that the seat did not slip and that the aircraft other-
wise complied with all FAA requirements.5 9 The only
evidence supporting the plaintiff's position was the testi-
mony of the surviving passenger who had lost all memory of
the event until just days prior to trial.' The jury concluded
that Cessna defectively designed the aircraft and failed to
provide adequate warnings. Thejury awarded the plaintiffs
$4 million in actual damages and $25 million in punitive
damages. 1
D. IDGE v. ESS A AINRCRAFT 62
A non-instrument rated pilot was flying a high-perform-
ance Cessna 210 from North Carolina to Washington,
D.C.63 The flight was the pilot's first without an instructor
in the Cessna 210.64 The pilot flew into instrument condi-
tions and apparently lost control of the aircraft. 5 The
NTSB concluded the probable cause of the accident was
the pilot's inadvertent flight into instrument meteorologi-
55ld.
- Liability Reform, supra note 50, at 8.




I6 d. Liability Reform, supra note 50, at 8.
62 See Ridge v. Cessna Aircraft, No. 4:90 CV 143 (M.D.N.C.). A jury returned a
verdict in early May 1994. As of November 1994, however, the court had not yet
entered a judgment, and a number of post-trial motions were pending.
63 Jury Awards $5 Million in Suit, AOPA PILOT, July 1994, at 36.
64 AIRCRAFr OWNERS AND PILOTS ASSOCIATION AIR SAFETY FOUNDATION REPORT No.
88-2148.
0 Juy Awards $5 Million, supra note 63, at 36.
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cal conditions while flying under visual flight rules.66 The
pilot's family filed suit against Cessna alleging that the tail
of the plane had been improperly designed.67 A North Car-
olina jury awarded the plaintiffs $5 million.68
E. D ADDARIO V AfITSUBISHI AIRCRAFT
ZNTERA TIONAL, IC.
6 9
A commercial operator of a twin-engine Mitsubishi MU-2
was transporting five passengers on a short trip between two
airports in the Chicago metropolitan area when the pilot
flew into icing conditions. The aircraft stalled and failed to
recover. 70 The NTSB determined the crash was caused by
pilot error. The families of two passengers filed suit against
the manufacturer and the operator of the aircraft, alleging
that the manufacturer failed to adequately warn and pro-
vide operating instructions regarding the hazards of in-
flight icing.7 '
Following a two-month trial, the jury awarded the survi-
vors of one passenger $55 million and the survivors of the
other passenger $7.55 million.72 The jury apportioned the
damages 35% to the manufacturer, Mitsubishi, and 65% to
the aircraft's operator.73
F. Hizzi v. PPER
Piper received a favorable jury verdict after spending al-
most $1 million defending itself in two years of litigation
stemming from a Super Cub which was crashed by a pilot




- D'Addario v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Int'l, Inc., 554 N.E.2d 209 (Ill. 1990).
70 See $62.55M Awarded Against Manufacturer and Owner of Twin Engine Airplane,




74 Liability Reform, supra note 50, at 8.
G. HARPER v ELANO CORP.
A pilot flying a Cessna 152 from Tennessee to Louisiana
on a clear day ran out of fuel and crashed.75 Three hours
after the crash, the pilot's blood alcohol level was 0.2 per-
cent.76 Cessna and a number of component manufacturers
were sued for $4.5 million.77 After four years of litigation,
the parties settled the suit for $50,000.78
H. FvANDEZ V. FoRD MOTOR Co.
A Piper Navajo crash-landed on the northbound lanes of
a California freeway. Hours after the crash, a motorist
travelling on the southbound lanes slowed down to "rubber-
neck" at the crash scene and was rear-ended by another mo-
torist.79 Piper was sued for creating an attractive nuisance.,0
III. THE INDUSTRY IS CRIPPLED
A. THE STATE OF GENERAL AvIATION IN THE 1990s
By the 1990s, the American general aviation industry was
on the verge of death. In 1992, American manufacturers
produced only 510 single-engine aircraft.8' No Skyhawks
were built; Cessna had determined the products liability en-
vironment was too hostile and stopped producing single-
piston engine aircraft in 1986.82 Piper, another industry gi-
ant, was forced into bankruptcy by tort judgments.8 3 The




n E. Glenn Parr, Address Before the National Commission to Ensure a Strong
Competitive Airline Industry (June 4, 1993).
Id.
81 GENERAL AvIATION MFa. Ass'N, GENERAL AViATION STATISTICAL DATABOOK 6
(1993 ed.). The 510 single-engine aircraft shipped in 1992 represented an all-time
American low, down from 14,398 single-engine aircraft shipped in 1978. Id.
82 Meyer, supra note 3, at 1. Cessna Chairman and CEO, Russell W. Meyer, Jr.,
stated that "this unlimited exposure to litigation is the sole reason... that Cessna
closed its single engine production lines in 1986, and it's the sole reason those lines
are still closed." Id.
83 See House Hearings, supra note 4 (statement of Charles Suma, President and
CEO, Piper Aircraft Corp.).
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price for single-engine aircraft of the same general size and
complexity of a Skyhawk exceeded $130,000 in 1994.84 The
single largest cost component in such general aviation air-
craft was the cost of products liability lawsuits. 5
While most suits were resolved in favor of manufacturers,
the cost of defending such suits during the 1980s was tre-
mendous. From 1976 to 1986, paid claims, defense costs,
and expenses for three leading general aviation manufac-
turers rose from $24 million to $210 million a year.86
In theory, products liability is designed to allocate the
costs of accidents to insurers of product manufacturers and
consumers of goods involved, rather than accident vic-
tims.8 7 In practice, insurers are generally no longer willing
to write policies for manufacturers. Consumers cannot af-
ford the cost of general aviation products that include
"passed through". product liability costs, and claimants re-
ceive, by one estimate, less than seventeen percent of the
money spent to defend and pay products liability claims.
84 Piston Airplanes in Production 1994, PRIVATE PILOT, May 1994, at 62-63. The least
expensive American built, all metal, four-seat fixed gear aircraft in production in
May 1994 was the Piper Warrior II with a base price of $128,800. The only other
aircraft produced in this country were two more powerful (and more expensive)
versions of the Warrior and the American General Tiger, which had a base price of
$139,400. Id.
Parr, supra note 79.
Martin, supra note 1, at 484-85. At the request of the House Aviation Subcom-
mittee of the Public Works and Transportation Committee, Beech Aircraft analyzed
203 lawsuits filed during a four-year period in the mid-1980s regarding general avia-
tion accidents. All the accidents involved in the study were investigated by the
NTSB, the FAA, or both. These investigations concluded pilot error was responsible
for 118 of the 203 accidents. Maintenance and weather accounted for another 43 of
the accidents. The investigations indicated that none of the 203 accidents were
caused by design or manufacturing defects. Nevertheless, the average amount
claimed in each of these lawsuits was $10 million, and the average cost to Beech was
$530,000 per accident. Id. at 485-86.
87 Epstein, supra note 8, at 646-48. Epstein sharply criticizes the theoretical foun-
ders of products liability law for naively assuming that private insurance would always
be available to manufacturers to shoulder the burden of losses allocated through
products liability. This assumption fails to consider the consequences that may re-
sult from the gradual uninsurability of certain products. "Today we have enough
experience with products liability to know that the legal rules can make certain types
of risks uninsurable and hence certain types of products unmarketable." Id. at 648.
TORT REFORM
B. INSURANCE Is GENERALLY UNAVAILABLE
TO MANUFACTURERS
Insurers have left the industry en masse. In the early
1970s, the first few major punitive damages awards, com-
bined with a sharp increase in passenger air traffic, created
a perception of increased aviation risk among insurers that
coincided with an increased demand for aviation cover-
age. 8 Premiums were set high, and when expected losses
did not immediately occur, insurers made significant
profits.89
In the meantime, the "new tort law" emerged in other
segments of the economy such as medical malpractice. 90
Aviation insurance was perceived as a relatively low risk
market and many insurers entered the market.91 Competi-
tion grew for available premiums. 2
While this competition drove insurance premiums down,
jury verdicts and defense costs started their upward spiral.93
The premiums collected were insufficient to cover expenses
and losses incurred in fast-growing products liability suits.94
In 1985, the world insurance market began to withdraw
products liability coverage for the American general avia-
tion industry.95 As one Lloyd's aviation underwriter stated,
"[w]e are quite prepared to insure the risks of aviation, but
not the risks of the American legal system."96 By 1987,
Piper was entirely uninsured, Cessna was uninsured for the
first $100 million of annual losses and defense costs, and
Beech was self-insured for the first $50 million in losses and
defense costs annually.9 7





95 Parr, supra note 79.
94 Id.
'5 Martin, supra note 1, at 483.
- Id. at 483-84.
9 Id. at 484. By 1987, the major manufacturers calculated their costs for products
liability per general aviation product unit ranged from $70,000 to $100,000. Id.
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C. THE MARKET CAN No LONGER SUPPORT THE COSTS
OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Once the insurance industry left general aviation, the
only remaining source of risk sharing was the general avia-
tion consumer. Fueled by mounting products liability
losses, increases in general aviation product prices far out-
stripped inflation."8
Each attempt to pass along the escalating litigation costs
to consumers pushes the price of general aviation products
further out of the reach of consumers. Increased litigation
costs regarding previously manufactured products are re-
covered by manufacturers through increasing new aircraft
prices.99 Ironically, because most consumers cannot afford
or justify the increased costs of new aircraft, they increas-
ingly rely on previously manufactured products.100
While it may have been feasible for consumers to pay
their share of products liability insurance when the industry
was producing over 10,000 single-engine aircraft per year,
consumers cannot conceivably bear the entire weight of
ever-increasing products liability losses and defense costs
spread among less than 600 single-engine aircraft produced
annually.
Some commentators have suggested the central function
of products liability is to compensate victims.101 Neither
current tort liability schemes, nor proposed alternative
See Thomas G. Donlan, Falling from the Sky: Unlimited Liability Claims Destroy an
American Industry, BARRON's, Feb. 21, 1994, at 10. In the last 20 years, consumer
prices have tripled, car prices have quadrupled, personal technology prices have
drastically fallen, and general aviation prices have increased eight to ten times. Id.
99 Martin, supra note 1, at 483.
100 Id.
101 Arlen, supra note 13, at 1116-17. Based on the conclusion of Professor Rabin
(his alternative compensation system is critiqued by Professor Arlen) that the central
function of products liability is to compensate victims, Professor Arlen concludes
that such compensation is "best viewed as a mandatory insurance policy because
manufacturers pass their expected liability costs on to consumers in the form of
higher product prices." Id. at 1117.
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compensation schemes, fulfill this victim compensation role
as effectively as first-party insurance. 10 2
Furthermore, the lengthy duration between the manufac-
ture of a product and the manifestation of a product defect
through resulting injury degrades the ability of products lia-
bility to serve as a conduit for victim compensation.10 3
Commentators theorize that if the time between manufac-
turing and manifestation of the liability becomes too great,
manufacturers will be unable to estimate their product's lia-
bility costs and incorporate such costs into the price of the
product.104 Therefore, manufacturers will be unable to
pass along costs for liability of used products to consumers
of new products.10 5 This theory precisely describes the situ-
ation in which general aviation manufacturers currently
find themselves. Not only has products liability failed to ef-
fectively compensate victims of general aviation accidents, it
has also failed to deter unnecessary risk or encourage safety
improvement: two goals of the tort system.
D. PRODUCTS LIABILITY SLOWED GENERAL AVIATION
SAFETY IMPROVEMENT
One of the primary arguments made in favor of products
liability is that such tort innovations promote product
safety.' 6 Specifically, some commentators consider one of
-o Id. Professor Arlen suggests that first-party insurance, as a solution to product
related injury, is a more equitable solution than the existing tort scheme or the
alternative compensation scheme proposed by Professor Rabin because it does "not
favor victims of product-related injuries over other victims, and . . . because the
administrative costs of first-party insurance are considerably lower than the adminis-
trative costs of a compensation system." Id.
-03 Id. at 1119.
104 Id.
105 Id. Professor Arlen compares the dilemma to a system of first-party insurance
where insurance providers need only look at a consumer's potential risks in a given
policy year to calculate premiums, and need not concern themselves with potential
latent liability in previously manufactured products. Id.
-o See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1354. Dean Schwartz suggests that limiting lia-
bility for punitive damages in cases involving regulated products may remove an
important incentive for product safety. Id. See also Martin, supra note 1, at 492.
If enforcement of strict liability through civil litigation against the
manufacturers of general aviation airplanes will indeed effectively de-
ter 'accident-causing behavior,' through resort to innovation and
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the most important aspects of the tort system to be the pros-
pect of tort liability as an incentive for manufacturers to ob-
tain and reveal information about a product's risks. 10 7
Economic analysis, however, suggests that deterring risk is
not a valid concern of products liability law because market
forces will ensure both that manufacturers use optimal care
in production and that the production level is efficient.108
Between 1950 and 1959, the number of fatal general avia-
tion accidents declined by 1.6 to 3.5 fatal accidents per
100,000 flight hours.1 9 Modern products liability had not
yet been developed during this period.110 Between 1959
and 1969, when only a handful of products liability cases
had surfaced, the fatal accident rate dropped by another
.95 to 2.55 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours.11 Be-
tween 1969 and 1979, when products liability began gaining
acceptance, the fatal accident rate dropped another .92 to
1.63 per 100,000 flight hours.1 2 Once products liability be-
came firmly established in the 1980s, the fatal accident rate
declined by only .23 per 100,000 flight hours." 3
Since 1980, designers have abandoned a number of
safety-related general aviation improvements out of fear of
the products liability exposure their introduction to the
market would create. 14  Engineers and managers, who
would otherwise assist in new product development, have
product improvement, then it should follow that the last 20 years of
vigorous and costly enforcement should demonstrate its benefits in
the safety record of general aviation.
Id.
107 Arlen, supra note 13, at 1120-26.
- Id. at 1116.





114 See The GeneralAviation Revitalization Act of 1993: Hearings on H.R. 3087 Before the
Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (statement of Frederick B. Sontag). Sontag, President of
Unison Industries Inc., a manufacturer of ignition components for light aircraft,
testified that Unison scrapped an advanced electronic ignition project for light air-
craft because the company was afraid of the liability risk. Id.; see also Parr, supra note
79, at 4. New general aviation products, which have not been introduced due to
552
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increasingly assisted in the defense of products liability law-
suits, or have been laid off as production dropped.11 5
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
A. THE STATUTE OF REPOSE
On August 17, 1994, President Clinton signed an eight-
een-year national statute of repose for general aviation
products. 16 A statute of repose sets a time limit for filing
suit regarding a product after the product is manufac-
tured.'1 7 This is contrasted with a statute of limitations,
which sets a time limit for filing suit after an injury has
occurred." 8
The statute of repose will be especially beneficial to gen-
eral aviation manufacturers due to the nature of their prod-
ucts. Unlike cars or appliances, airplanes are routinely in
use thirty or forty years after they are manufactured.' 9 In
products liability fears, include flight training aircraft, heads-up display for critical
flight instruments, and engines that improve fuel and weight efficiencies. Id.
"5 See Martin, supra note 1, at 482. By 1977, engineers and managers for Beech,
Cessna, and Piper were increasingly involved in defending their respective employ-
ers in product liability lawsuits. Id. at 482; Parr, supra note 79, at 3. Company engi-
neering experts are diverted from new products design to participate in the
litigation process, including researching document files, giving depositions, and tes-
tifying in court. Id.; Meyer, supra note 3, at 2. Between 1965 and 1982, Cessna
invested $20425 million each year in research and development. Cessna halted pis-
ton engine research and development in 1986 but has since spent $20425 million
each year defending products liability cases. Id.
116 See The Revitalization Act, supra note 21. The full text of the Act appears as
Appendix 1 to this article.
117 Id.; see also Parr, supra note 79, at 21-23.
I'8 See BLACK'S LAw DicroNARY 927 (6th ed. 1990). A statute of limitation de-
clares that no suit shall be maintained on a cause of action unless the suit is brought
within a specified period of time after the right of action accrues. l
"9 Martin, supra note 1, at 486-88. Those who formulated strict products liability
law failed to account for the distinction between products purchased and used as
capital items with a long service life and those products purchased as consumables,
with a relatively short life. General aviation aircraft are capital items with a long
service life.
Airplanes are complex, expensive high-performance machines
designed for the markets into which they are sold, which means that
the better, more durable, and reliable the design and construction of
a plane are, the more likely it will be a success in the marketplace and
the longer it will last once it gets there.
Id. at 487.
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1992, the average age of general aviation aircraft in use in
the United States was 25.6 years.'12  While an airplane gen-
erates no more income for its manufacturer after its initial
sale, the airplane presented a practically unlimited prod-
ucts liability risk until destroyed, prior to enactment of the
statute of repose. 121 Thus, a Piper Cub manufactured in
1939 presented Piper with virtually the same degree of
products liability risk as a brand new plane. Even if the
market could support the potential costs of products liabil-
ity for previously manufactured products, such costs would
be virtually impossible to quantify. 122 A virtually limitless
"products liability tail" presented an unacceptable risk to
most manufacturers, insurers, and lenders.1
23
The current statute of repose provides that civil tort ac-
tions arising from general aviation aircraft accidents against
120 GENERAL AVIATION MFR. Ass'N, supTa note 81, at 11.
121 Martin, supra note 1, at 487.
With enough units in service in the United States for a sufficient
number of years, the annual risk-cost of those units, which can be cov-
ered only by additions to the price of new airplanes currently coming
down the production line, will at some point put the manufacturer in
the position of having to price its products out of the market. The
fewer units the manufacturer can sell at product liability-inflated
prices, the more it must add to the price of each unit it does sell to
cover the risk-cost of the units in service.
Id.
122 See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 13, at 1119. The long lag time between the payment
of a products liability premium and the time when the risk is realized may "sever the
link between the product price and the insurance provided to such an extent that
the products liability insurance market will not be viable." Id.
123 See Parr, supra note 79, at 13-14. Insurance costs depend largely on underwrit-
ers' ability to evaluate the risks they insure. For general aviation manufacturers,
insurance costs for a particular policy year have been a factor of the size of the fleet
built up over the life of the manufacturer (the manufacturers' "products liability
tail"). Such costs were not related to the type, nature, or number of products sold in
a policy year. Given the longevity of the average general aviation aircraft, it is easy to
see how the difficulty in quantifying such a long-term risk led most insurers to leave
the general aviation products liability market in the 1980s. Similarly, general avia-
tion manufacturers realized that their company's assets had little or no marketability
because any buyer would have to assume the company's products liability tail, which
may exceed the value of the company. Likewise, lenders shied away from general
aviation manufacturers because of the enormous latent liability presented by the
company's products liability tail. "Potential investors in a general aviation manufac-
turer must consider the likelihood of a collision between a 747 full of neurosurge-
ons and an airplane built by that manufacturer." Id.
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a manufacturer are barred eighteen years after the date of
the product's delivery. 124 The Act defines general aviation
aircraft as any aircraft with a seating capacity of fewer than
twenty persons which has been certified by the FAA and
which was not engaged in scheduled passenger carrying ac-
tivity at the time of the accident. 2 5 The repose period is
restarted for any new component added to a previously
manufactured product.1 26 Thus, if a new engine is installed
in a twenty-year-old aircraft, the engine manufacturer can-
not avail itself of the statute of repose until the engine has
been in service for eighteen years.
The statute of repose provides exceptions for instances
where a manufacturer is shown to have knowingly withheld
relevant and material information that was required to be
disclosed to the FAA, and such concealment is causally re-
lated to the harm suffered by the plaintiff.1 27 The Act also
provides exceptions to the statute of repose for passengers
on medical or emergency evacuation flights, injury to per-
sons or property on the ground as a result of an aircraft
accident, and for actions brought under an otherwise en-
forceable written warranty.1 28 The Act explicitly supersedes
any state law to the extent such law permits tort actions re-
garding the type of accidents to which the statute of repose
applies after the expiration of the repose period.1 29 The
Act trims the products liability tail to a manageable
length. 3 Logically if an airplane has operated safely for
eighteen years, the airplane was not defectively designed or
manufactured.1 3
1
124 See The Revitalization Act, supra note 21.
'2 Id. § 2(c).
- Id. § 2 (a) (2).
12 Id. § 2(b)(1).
Id. §§ 2(b)(2)-(4).
l'9 Id. § 2(d).
'so See Parr, supra note 79, at 21-22. The statute of repose is designed to "free
manufacturers from one of their chief burdens: the threat of eternal, open-ended
liability for products which long ago passed from their control." Id.
13, See Donlan, supra note 98, at 10. By the time most general aviation aircraft are
15 years old they have had at least three major engine overhauls and have accumu-
lated 6,000 hours of flying time. "The theory of the statute of repose is that such use
ought to demonstrate the safety of the basic design." Id.
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By putting some limit on the risk of liability created by a
given product, the statute's proponents hope to resurrect
the general aviation industry.1 32 Indeed, Cessna's chairman
stated that, based on the passage of the statute of repose
alone, Cessna will reopen light plane production lines and,
in the first year of renewed manufacturing, will build 2,000
single-engine planes, including the venerable Skyhawk
1 33
Plaintiffs can be expected to challenge the constitutional-
ity of the statute of repose, as they have challenged other
examples of tort reform. Several states have passed statutes
of repose in various fields. 13 4  Injured parties have chal-
lenged the constitutional validity of state statutes of repose
on a number of occasions.1 35  Many of these challenges
have been based on the state and federal constitutional
guarantees of due process, equal protection, and access to
112 See Meyer, supra note 3, at 7 ("Congressional passage of the statute of repose
for general aviation aircraft would be the single most important stimulant for the
entire general aviation industry.").
133 See Collins, Cessna Boss Talks About the Future, FLYING MAGAZINE, Aug. 1994, at
82-83. Cessna Chairman Russell Meyer stated that Cessna was committed to restart
production of piston engine aircraft upon passage of the statute of repose. Cessna
will build no less than 2,000 single-piston engine aircraft per year. Meyer estimates
such production would include 800 to 1,200 Cessna 172 Skyhawks, 400 to 500
Cessna 182 Skylanes, and 400 to 500 Cessna 206 Stationairs. Id. at 83.
134 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN § 12-551 (1991) (stating no products liability
action can be commenced and prosecuted if the cause of action accrues more than
12 years after the product was first sold for consumption); COLO. REv. STAT. § 52-
577a (1994) (holding no products liability claim may be brought against any party
later than 10 years from the date the party last parted with possession of the prod-
uct); GA. CODE ANN. 93-3-71 (West 1994) (stating no products liability claim may be
brought against a manufacturer after 10 years of sale of the product, but does not
bar claims of willful, reckless, and wanton disregard for life and property); ILL. REV.
STAT. CH. 735 § 5/13-214 (1984) (holding no action based upon tort, contract, or
otherwise may be brought after 10 years of delivery date to initial user of first sale);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (1994) (action based on product liability barred after 6 years
from sale for initial use or consumption); TEX. CIV. PRo. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 16.008-.009 (Vernon 1978) (no action against architects, engineers, or others
who build improvements to new property may be brought after 10 years).
1 SeeNancy E. Leibowitz, Note, Statutes of Limitations - Medical Malpractice
Constitutional Law - Five Year Statute of Repose of Medical Malpractice Claims that Com-
mences When an Injury Occurs is Constitutiona4 16 UNIv. BALT. L.R. 571 (1987). But see
BOBBIEJ. RASMUSSON, Limitation of Actions - North Dakota's Product Liability Act Statute
or Repose Found Unconstitutional 63 N.D.C. REv. 127 (1987).
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the courts. 136 Generally, state courts have upheld statutes
of repose as constitutional. 137
B. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Congress specifically mandated that the FAA regulate the
design, manufacture, maintenance, and operation of all
aircraft in the United States.138 The FAA has set strict stan-
dards to ensure compliance with its congressional man-
date.1 39 Indeed, the design and manufacture of all classes
of airplanes are among the most closely regulated of all
American industries. 140 Safety is the primary objective of
this regulatory scheme. 41 Manufacturers spend millions of
dollars ensuring that their products comply with these
regulations.142
Despite the obvious national interest in regulating air-
borne commerce and ensuring the safety of air travel, the
widely varying common law and statutory tort schemes of
the fifty states have had a crushing impact on the design
and manufacture of general aviation products.1 43 This im-
26 See Brown v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Ariz. 1991) (holding
12-year statute of repose in products liability action did not violate Arizona Constitu-
tion, which stated that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law); Kilemin v. Rimrick Corp., 542 A.2d 720 (Conn. 1988)
(stating that 10-year statute of repose for products liability does not violate equal
protection); Whingham v. Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics, Inc. 613 So. 2d 110
(Fl. 1993) (declaring medical malpractice statute of repose did not violate constitu-
tional right of access to courts); Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc., 37 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 742 (April 28, 1994) (holding Texas statute of repose does not violate an
individual right to due process of law under the United States Constitution).
137 See generally note 136.
1- See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1421; see also Martin, supra note 1, at 488.
139 See Martin, supra note 1, at 488; see also 14 C.F.R §§ 23, 33, 35 (1994).
140 Martin, supra note 1, at 488.
141 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1421.
142 See Martin, supra note 1, at 488.
143 See Parr, supra note 79, at 18-19. "General aviation products are designed, man-
ufactured, operated and maintained in accordance with uniform federal standards,
but product liability is determined by the unique procedural and substantive legal
rules of the fifty states, the District of Columbia and the federal courts." Id. at 18; see
also Kenneth P. Quinn, Address at the Lawyer Pilot Bar Association Annual meeting
(Aug. 23, 1991) (copy on file with the authors). Quinn, chief counsel for the FAA,
remarked that "while general aviation remains strong, it has been buffeted by severe
turbulence whose source is a civil justice system that is spinning out of control." Id.
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pact clearly thwarts the federal statutory and regulatory
scheme to promote safe air travel.144
It has been suggested in both legislative and judicial fo-
rums is that existing laws and regulations concerning avia-
tion should preempt state tort law in the area.1 45  This
approach to tort reform would be similar to the federal pre-
emption of state tort law concerning employee group insur-
ance and retirement plans by ERISA. 1
46
C. AIRWORTHINESS DiREcTrVE INCOMPLIANCE DEFENSE
The airworthiness directive is one of the methods that
the FAA uses to ensure the safety of aircraft long after they
are initially manufactured.1 47 If the FAA determines that a
potential safety problem arising from a component of a cer-
tain type of aircraft exists, the FAA can issue an airworthi-
ness directive to the owners and mechanics who maintain
such aircraft describing the potential problem, indicating
how to detect the problem, and suggesting a method for
remedying the problem. 148
14 Parr, supra note 79, at 8-9, citing Brief for United States of America as amicus
curiae at 1-2, Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp., No. 91-2065 (10th Cir. 1992) (opin-
ion of the court reported at 985 F.2d 1438). "Air commerce ... cannot remain safe
and continue to grow if every plane that rises into the airways is subjected to a multi-
tude of different-and potentially conflicting-state standards of care." Id.,
145 See Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1441-47. The Tenth Circuit rejected the preemption
arguments that Piper and the United States made in Cleveland. Id. See also Public
Health Trust of Dade County v. Lake Aircraft, Inc., 992 F.2d 291, 292-95 (11th Cir.
1993) (following the Tenth Circuit rejection of preemption argument on Cleveland).
See also General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act of 1993, H.R. 67, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act of
1993 would have superseded any state law regarding recovery for harm arising out of
a general aviation accident to the extent that the Act established a rule of law or
procedure applicable to such a claim. Id.
1 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)-(b) (1988);
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987) (stating ERISA preempts state
common law actions based on bad faith by an insurance company.); Hermann Hosp.
v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
ERISA preempts all state law claims that relate to any employee benefit plan.)
147 See, e.g., CLAm, supra note 26, at 97. When an unforeseen problem arises in a
particular make or model of aircraft following the manufacturing process, the FAA
can issue airworthiness directives with requirements for inspection, service, repair,




Depending on venue, it is currently of little or no conse-
quence in a products liability action that the owner of an
aircraft failed to comply with an airworthiness directive.1 49
At least one unsuccessful general aviation products liability
bill proposed that the failure to comply with an airworthi-
ness directive should constitute a defense or bar to a subse-
quent products liability suit against the manufacturer. 150
For example, if the FAA issued an airworthiness directive
indicating that the landing gear of a certain type of aircraft
developed cracks after five thousand hours of use, then in-
dicated how to detect the problem, and suggested how to
remedy the situation, and the owner of such an aircraft
failed to have his aircraft inspected and repaired in accord-
ance with the airworthiness directive, the manufacturers of
the aircraft could assert such a failure to comply as a de-
fense to a products liability action following an accident
caused by the problem.
D. COMPARATIVE FAULT
The concept of comparative fault developed contempora-
neously with the products liability explosion.' The theory
behind comparative fault is that damages should be
awarded based on one's degree of fault in causing damages,
as compared with others who have similarly caused the
same damages.15 2 Thus, the payment of damages awarded
is allocated among liable defendants based on their respec-
tive degrees of fault, and such damages are reduced in pro-
'1 See Parr, supra note 79, at 16. Courts in many states instruct juries that a pilot's
negligence is irrelevant in a strict liability action because strict products liability is
determined without regard to fault. Id.
I- The General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act of 1993, S. 67, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(c)(1) (1993).
is, SeeWILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., TORTS 576 n.1 (8th ed. 1988). By the mid-1960s,
only six states had adopted some form of comparative negligence. Between 1965
and 1986, however, an additional 36 states adopted some form of comparative fault.
Id.
152 See PROSSER, supra note 151, at 577-84 (discussing various systems of compara-
tive fault and problems associated with such systems); BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 389-
93 (6th ed. 1990).
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portion to the plaintiff's own degree of fault.153  Many
states, however, do not allow consideration of a plaintiff's
actions in causing his or her own damages where liability is
based on strict products liability.1"4 The theory behind
such practice is that strict products liability is liability based
solely on the nature of a product without regard to fault.155
In practice, however, the failure to consider a plaintiff's
conduct leads to clearly inequitable results. In Cleveland v.
Piper 56 the pilot of a Super Cub and his mechanic made
significant alterations to the Cub's seating, which surely
could not have been foreseen by Piper, and then attempted
an ill-advised take-off over a van that was intentionally
parked in the middle of the runway by the airport owner.15 7
All of these actions were clearly direct causes of the damage
resulting from the crash. Because the plaintiff sued Piper
under a strict products liability theory, however, the jury
could only consider the actions of Piper and the pilot in
assessing liability for "crashworthiness" negligence. 58
Approximately eighty-five percent of general aviation ac-
cidents are caused, at least in part, by pilot error. 59 If man-
ufacturers were uniformly able to present evidence of such
153 Id.
154 See PROSSER, supra note 151, at 783 n.6. The various comparative fault systems
adopted by the states, either judicially or legislatively, were confined to negligence.
Arkansas was the first state to expand comparative negligence to comparative fault
and specifically apply the concept of comparative fault to strict products liability
cases. Id. As of 1986, 30 states applied comparative fault to products liability cases.
Id.
I15 See, e.g., Parr, supra note 79, at 16. "The courts reason that strict liability is a
means of compensating persons injured by defective products regardless of whether
the manufacturer was negligent; therefore, it is equally unnecessary to consider the
negligence of the plaintiff". Id.
1 See Cleveland, 890 F.2d at 1546.
15, Id. at 1542.
158 Id. at 1574. The Tenth Circuit found the trial court's failure to allow consider-
ation of the fault of the driver of the van and the mechanic, who removed the Super
Cub's seat and replaced it with the wooden bench and camera mount, constituted
error and remanded the case for a retrial in which the culpability of each tortfeasor
involved would be compared. Id. at 1556.
159 See Parr, supra note 79, at figure 3. Pilot error caused or contributed to 84.7%
of general aviation accidents from 1983-1987. In 1988, the figure rose to 85.1% Id.
560
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error in products liability suits, the exposure presented by
such suits could be significantly reduced.
E. PUNITivE DAMAGES
Perhaps the greatest threat posed to American industry
by "the new tort law" is the threat of punitive damages.160
By definition, such damages do not compensate a plaintiff
for damages caused by a defendant or a defendant's prod-
uct, but instead are intended to punish and make an exam-
ple of a defendant for certain types of aggravated
conduct.16 1 While the United States Supreme Court has in-
dicated that there are constitutional limits to such damages,
these limits have yet to be defined.1 62 As a result of such
1w See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1357-58 (1993). Tort reform proponents cite
punitive damages as a central problem in the American tort system. Demands for
punitive damages are perceived to be routine, and awards of punitive damages ap-
pear to have drastically increased over the last decade. Id.
Tort reform critics respond by merely denying the legitimacy of such concerns.
Instead, such champions of punitive damages maintain that "punitive damage
awards are indeed rare in frequency and moderate in amount." See Burrows, supra
note 13, at 442.
As suggested by the general counsel of the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association:
[i]f the manufacturers perceive a problem and withdraw from the man-
ufacture of aviation products, if new entrants are deterred from the
marketplace because of a perceived problem, if insurance companies
are unwilling to write coverages or must charge premiums too expen-
sive for the manufacturers because of a perceived problem, then it is
not important whether the problem is real. The perception is real.
And the unavailability of aviation products is real.
Yodice, supra note 24.
161 See, e.g., Shores, supra note 11, at 70. "Punitive damages are necessary as a civil
form of punishment because they serve as a method of punishing behavior that soci-
ety condemns .... " Id.
-6 See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2720-24
(1993). In TXO Prod. Cop., the Court acknowledged that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes substantive limits on punitive damages. Id. at
2718. The Court indicated, however, that it could not "draw a mathematical bright
line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable
to fit every case." Id. at 2720 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,
18 (1991)). The Court instead indicated that factors such as a general concern for
reasonableness, the relationship of punitive damages to actual damages, and the
potential harm that might result from the defendant's conduct should be consid-
ered in determining the constitutionality of a punitive damage award. Id. at 2720-
22.
See also Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994). The Court found
Oregon's appellate scheme unconstitutional because it only allowed an appellate
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limitless exposure, products liability lawsuits present a
wholly unpredictable risk to industry, 163 a lottery-like wind-
fall to victims and survivors of accidents who are awarded
such damages, 164 and a tremendous economic incentive to
plaintiffs' attorneys to strive for punitive damages in any
given case. 165 Legal commentators have proposed various
methods of restricting the inequitable effect of punitive
damages, some of which have been adopted at the state
level. Any of these punitive damage reform concepts would
offer invaluable breathing room to the ailing general avia-
tion industry.
1. Limiting Punitive Damages
One of the most common punitive damage reform pro-
posals is to place a limit on recoverable punitive dam-
ages.1 66 A number of states have experimented with such
limits. 16 7  Punitive damage limits can be either a fixed
court to review an award of punitive damages if no evidence existed to support the
award. Id. at 2341. The Court noted that "[p] unitive damages pose an acute danger
of arbitrary deprivation of property." Id. at 2340. Specifically, the Court stated that
the imposition of punitive damages "is an exercise of state power that must comply
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 2342.
163 See Parr, supra note 79, at 14. "A lender of working'capital may be impressed
with the manufacturer's order book.., but there is no guarantee that a $60 million
liability expense will not occur in any one case." Id.
164 See, e.g., Shores, supra note 11, at 89-90. Judicial and societal concerns regard-
ing the windfall effect of punitive damages appear in cases reported as early as 1877.
Id. at 89.
10 See Burrows, supra note 13, at 446. Punitive damage proponents contend that
"[w]ithout the incentive of punitive damages, the 'emotional and financial stress' of
suing may prevent many tort victims from bringing suit." Id.; see also Schwartz, supra
note 18, at 1354-55. Punitive damage proponents also contend that any limitation
on the availability of punitive damages (such as those proposed for general aviation
aircraft) would adversely affect plaintiffs' ability to obtain settlements because the
availability of punitive damages, even in cases in which they are unlikely to be
awarded, gives plaintiffs additional clout to negotiate settlements. Id.
166 See Shores, supra note 11, at 85-87 (discussing various methods that states have
employed to limit the availability of punitive damages).
167 Id.; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (West 1989) (stating that punitive dam-
ages are limited to amount equal to actual damages, however, court has discretion to
award up to three times actual damages in certain cases); FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 768.73
(Harrison Supp. 1994) (holding that punitive damage awards are presumptively lim-
ited to three times actual damages); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001-.008
(Vernon Supp. 1994) (stating exemplary damages are limited to the greater of four
times actual damages or $200,000 in cases involving fraud or gross negligence).
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amount of damages recoverable, an amount fixed as a ratio
of actual damages awarded, or some combination of these
formulae."'8
Some states have tried more novel methods to limit puni-
tive damage awards. Kansas passed legislation limiting pu-
nitive damages in medical malpractice cases to the lesser of
twenty-five percent of the defendants' highest gross annual
income during the five years preceding the tort, or three
million dollars. 169 Georgia passed a law limiting punitive
damages to the first plaintiff who brought suit against a
given defendant for a particular wrongful act.17 0
General limits on punitive damage awards have been crit-
icized as an inefficient means of deterrence.17' Such gener-
alized caps fail to consider the particular circumstances of
individual cases. 7 2 Thus, a general limitation on punitive
damages may allow exceedingly harsh awards in some cases,
while only permitting relatively insignificant awards in
others. 73
2. Redirecting Punitive Damages
Punitive damage redirection would give all or part of pu-
nitive damages awarded to the state.' 74 The theory behind
this proposal is since punitive damages are, by definition,
not intended to compensate a plaintiff for any actual loss, a
plaintiff would not be deprived of any property rights by
't See Shores, supra note 11, at 85-87.
Id at 86-87. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402 (Supp. 1994). Kansas' punitive
damage limitation was held unconstitutional in Kansas Malpractice Victims Coali-
tion v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988).
170 See Shores, supra note 11, at 87; GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(E)(1) (Michie
Supp. 1994). A federal district court subsequently found this type of punitive dam-
age limitation unconstitutional. See McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp.
1563, 1578-79 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
171 See Shores, supra note 11, at 87.
172 Id.; See also TXO Prod, Corp., 113 S. Ct. at 2721-22. (stating that constitutional
review of punitive damage award should not concentrate entirely on relationship
between actual and punitive damages).
173 Id.
74 See generally Burrows, supra note 13. By 1992, at least nine states enacted "state
extraction statutes" mandating that varying portions of punitive damage awards be
awarded to the state or a subdivision of the state. Id. at 438 n.6.
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giving punitive damages to the state. 175 By redirecting puni-
tive damages, the risk of an unjustified windfall is reduced
and the economic incentive to overevaluate a case and over-
state a defendant's potential liability is removed. 176 Since a
plaintiff would not personally benefit from a punitive dam-
age award, in theory, plaintiffs and plaintiffs' attorneys
would only seek such an award out of sincere indignation at
an aggravated wrong, as opposed to personal financial gain.
It has also been suggested that trial judges could use their
inherent power to redirect punitive damage awards to pub-
lic or charitable funds that they deem appropriate, even
without legislation specifically directing them to do so.
1 77
173 Some state extraction statutes have been challenged as unconstitutional tak-
ings of private property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. Id. at 438-39; see also Burke v. Deere & Co., 780 F. Supp.
1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (upholding Iowa's state extraction statute), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1063 (1994); McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga.
1990) (striking down Georgia's state extraction statute); Kirk v. Denver Publishing
Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (striking down Colorado's state extraction statute);
Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (upholding Florida's state extraction
statute), cert. denied, sub nom. Gordon v. Florida, 113 S. Ct. 1647 (1993). It is gener-
ally acknowledged, however, that plaintiffs have no personal right to punitive dam-
ages. See Shores, supra note 11, at 90.
176 See Stephen D. Susman, A Case for a Ceasefire, Address Before the Texas Asso-
ciation of Civil Trial and Appellate Specialists 7 (April 21, 1994) (transcript on file
with authors). The major complaint regarding punitive damages "is not that the
wrongdoer has to pay punitives, but that the victim and his attorney are the recipi-
ents of a windfall." Id. Such criticism might be resolved by payment of punitive
damages, less attorneys' fees, to institutions of higher education. Id. See also Shores,
supra note 11, at 90. Commentators suggest that the windfall effect of punitive dam-
ages might be eliminated by payment of such damages to the state. Id.
See Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 802. The Gordon court explained that one of the pur-
poses of Florida's state extraction statute was to make punitive damage claims less
financially beneficial to a claimant and the claimant's attorney. Id. Punitive damage
proponents have criticized such reasoning as presupposing "a tort crisis where plain-
tiffs and their attorneys are greedy wealth seekers who put forth frivolous claims in
an effort to receive a windfall in punitive damages." See Burrows, supra note 13, at
445. It would appear naive, however, to suggest that plaintiffs who include prayers
for millions of dollars in punitive damages are never motivated, at least in part, by
the potential of great financial gain. State extraction statutes merely remove the
more controversial aspect of punitive damages, namely providing a windfall to plain-
tiffs, while leaving the traditional goals of punishment and deterrence intact. See
Shores, supra note 11, at 91.
1" See Shores, supra note 11, at 90-91. Justice Shores analogizes this inherent
power to that employed by courts in shaping remedies related to prisons and school
systems. "The authority of courts to shape remedies in the area of public law litiga-
tion is no longer seriously questioned." Id. at 91. Justice Shores contends that there
Theoretically, plaintiffs would have no basis to complain of
such an order because constitutional rights would not be
implicated. 7
3. Barring Punitive Damages After Showing of Regulatory
Compliance
Some commentators and legislators have drawn a distinc-
tion between most negligence and strict products liability
claims and those that involve products that are subject to
federal regulation and approval. 179 One proposal is to limit
or bar punitive damages in cases involving heavily regulated
products. The rationale behind a regulatory compliance
punitive damage ban is that stringent regulatory programs,
such as those applied to drug and aircraft manufacturers,
fulfill the goals of punitive damages by assessing punish-
ment where appropriate, and deterring noncompliance.
Thus, subsequent punitive damage assessments are redun-
dant.'80 Where manufacturers are subject to punishment
and deterrence through both regulatory schemes and the
threat of common law punitive damages, the result can be
"overdeterrence" by which manufacturers are discouraged
from producing any products.' 8 While a regulatory com-
pliance punitive damage ban was incorporated in at least
one comprehensive federal products liability reform bill,1
8 2
the measure was not enacted.
4. Eliminating Punitive Damages
The most drastic of punitive damage reform concepts is
the complete elimination of punitive damages. While the
elimination of punitive damages might constitute the most
popular tort reform proposal among manufacturers, con-
should be no less authority where the issue is punitive damages sought to address
harm to society at large. Id.
178 See id. at 91. But see supra notes 134-35.
17 See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1336-38.
- Id. at 1337.
181 Id.
in See Product Liability Fairness Act, S. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see aLso
Schwartz, supra note 18, at 1336-38.
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gressional passage of such a drastic measure is not politi-
cally feasible.1 83
F. DEGREES OF PROOF
As American tort law evolved, plaintiffs were required to
prove their cases by a preponderance of credible evidence
in order to establish liability.8 4 One partial solution to the
inequities created by recent tort trends would be to in-
crease the standard of proof necessary to establish liability
for punitive damages or strict liability." 5 A plaintiff seeking
to establish the liability of a general aviation manufacturer
under strict products liability or the award of punitive dam-
ages might be required to prove his or her case by clear and
convincing evidence as opposed to the mere preponder-
ance of evidence necessary to establish negligence.186
'8 As of 1992, New Hampshire, Louisiana, and Nebraska had legislatively elimi-
nated punitive damage awards. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (Supp. 1991);
Ricard v. State, 390 So. 2d 882, 885 (La. 1980), ovedrued by Booze v. City of Alexan-
dria, 637 So. 2d 91 (La. 1994); Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443
N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb. 1989); see also Shores, supra note 11, at 87-88. The vociferous
criticism and general failure of far less drastic federal tort reform measures suggest
that a punitive damage ban would be politically inviable. Furthermore, most legal
commentators agree on the general benefit of the punishment and deterrence goals
of punitive damages, and instead disagree on the most equitable methods for their
implementation.
1" See, e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990).
18 Alabama, California, Georgia, Minnesota, Montana, and Oregon have adopted
the clear and convincing standard of evidence required to prove entitlement to pu-
nitive damages. ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (Supp. 1994); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West
Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Michie Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 549.20(1) (West Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (1991); Ober, 114
S. Ct. at 2333. Florida and Oklahoma have adopted modified clear and convincing
standard requirements. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 768.73 (Harrison Supp. 1994); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987). Colorado has adopted a "beyond a reasonable
do-ubt" burden of proof regarding punitive damages. COLO. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 13-
25-127(2) (West 1989). See also Shores, supra note 11, at 88.
18 Unsuccessful tort reform measures have proposed an enhanced burden of
proof for punitive damages. See, e.g., The Product Liability Fairness Act, S. 640, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act of 1991,




After punitive damages, contingency fee contracts are
perhaps the most often criticized component of American
tort law. 187 Until recently, contingency attorney fee con-
tracts were considered unethical. 188 Indeed, most other in-
dustrialized nations do not allow contingency contracts.1 89
On the one hand, the contingency fee contract empowers a
plaintiff who could not otherwise afford legal representa-
tion to obtain such representation based .on the .strength of
his or her lawsuit. 190 On the other hand, contingency fee
contracts clearly give a plaintiff's attorney a personal finan-
cial interest in the outcome of such actions.19' The more
money that can be squeezed out of any given case from
every available source, the more money a plaintiff's attor-
ney will recover.
The most drastic reform of contingency fee contracts
would be to eliminate such arrangements. Once again,
such a measure would likely be politically unfeasible and
potentially unconstitutional. More reasonable reform con-
cepts might include reducing allowable contingency fee
percentages, restricting contingency fee recovery to a per-
centage of compensatory damages awarded, or limiting
187 See, e.g., Stewart Jay, The Dilemmas of Attorney Contingent Fees, 2 GEt. J. LEGAL
ETmics 813 (1989) ("Contingent fees for attorneys traditionally have been the sub-
ject of derision. Critics have long complained that contingency contracts stir up
litigation . . . over-compensate counsel and produce sharp practices by plaintiffs'
lawyers ...
-a8 Richard M. Birnholz, The Validity and Propriety of Contingent Fee Controls, 37
UCLA L. REv. 949, 952 (1990).
189 Id.
190 Jay, supra note 187, at 814. "Studies by economists demonstrate that 'a substan-
tial number of low and middle-income plaintiffs would be deterred from filing even
meritorious claims in the absence of contingent fees .... '" Id. (citing P. DANZON,
CONTINGENT FEES FOR PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION 39 (1980)); see also Birnholz,
supra note 188, at 953. The justification for contingency fees is that they allow those
who lack the means to pay a lawyer's hourly fees access to the courts. Thus, even the
poorest litigants may obtain legal representation. Id.
191 SeeJay, supra note 187 ("A long held belief about contingent fees is that they
provide plaintiffs' lawyers with an incentive to file frivolous claims and to employ
sharp practices in processing lawsuits."). Id. at 878.
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plaintiffs' attorneys to an hourly fee in cases that are settled
within a short period after suit is filed.1 92
2. Defense Fees
While plaintiffs attorneys' contingency fees may draw the
lion's share of attention from tort reform proponents, the
general aviation industry might benefit as much or more
from reformation of the way in which defense fees are
paid.1 93 While much of the increase in attorneys' fees and
litigation costs paid by general aviation manufacturers is at-
tributable to both the increased number and the increased
risk of products liability suits, the attorney fee arrangements
themselves will likely be subject to close scrutiny as the in-
dustry struggles to revitalize itself.
Over the last four to five years, many industries have at-
tempted to check their escalating litigation expenditures. 194
Defense firms face mounting pressure to reduce billing
rates, reduce the number of attorneys who work on a given
case, provide more detailed accounting for fees billed, and
to bear a greater share of costs such as clerical support and
photocopying. Many industries, including the general avia-
tion industry, may need to turn to law firms who are able to
provide such modified billing arrangements in order to re-
duce overall losses attributable to litigation.
H. TARGETING THE FRivoLous SUIT
In many respects general aviation has been harmed more
by having to defend patently frivolous lawsuits in which the
plaintiff ultimately recovers nothing than by the relatively
192 See, Birnholz, supra note 188, at 979-83. See also Susman, supra note 176, at 8.
Susman explains that commercial plaintiffs routinely negotiate modified contin-
gency fee contracts that lessen the likelihood of attorney windfall in instances of
early settlement and suggests that the plaintiff's bar might improve its public image
by making such allowance for any client, regardless of bargaining power. Id.
OS See Liability Reform, supra note 50, at 4 (noting the excessive costs aircraft manu-
facturers have been forced to pay for legal defense). Insured and uninsured costs
associated with defending products liability cases account for a large portion of the
skyrocketing products liability burden borne by the general aviation industry.
194 See William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERs L. REv. I
(1991).
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few cases in which plaintiffs are awarded large recoveries. 195
Some tort reform concepts are designed to allow more effi-
cient resolution of patently frivolous claims, such as those
previously cited examples wherein crashes were caused by
pilots under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
For example, one common suggestion for coping with
the costs of defending frivolous lawsuits is to award reason-
able attorneys' fees to the prevailing party.1 96 In theory, the
party who insists on drawing a meritless lawsuit out over sev-
eral years before taking it before a jury would bear the costs
of such a decision. 197 In practice, however, such a mecha-
nism would probably fail. Absent a favorable verdict, the
average plaintiff is not capable of paying his or her own at-
torneys' fees, and cannot reasonably be expected to pay
the hundreds of thousands of dollars routinely expended in
defense of products liability suits.198
-9 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 1, at 482-83. Beech conducted a study of insurance
and defense costs during a 58-month period during the mid-1970s. This study re-
vealed that, of the $18 million Beech spent insuring and defending against products
liability claims, approximately 16.6% of the amount spent was actually paid to claim-
ants. Beech obtained favorable verdicts in 80% of the cases brought to trial. The
tort litigation system produced "an extravagant award in some aviation cases, a rea-
sonable award in a few cases, and no recovery at all in most cases." Id.
- See Goerdt, supra note 14, at 16. In February 1992, Vice President Dan
Quayle's office released the Civil Justice Reform Model State Amendments, which
embodied a number of tort reform proposals including the loser pays attorneys' fee
rule. As included in the model amendments, this rule requires the non-prevailing
party to pay the attorneys' fees of the prevailing party, which may not exceed their
own attorneys' fees, and can be limited by the judge if the amount of fees is deemed
unjust. The amendment would require all attorneys to keep accurate hourly records
of efforts on any given case.
197 Id.
SId. Many commentators express concern that plaintiffs would generally be de-
terred from filing lawsuits if there is a chance they will have to pay their opponent's
fees. Some commentators have suggested that the loser pays rule effectively raises
the burden of proof placed on plaintiffs because plaintiffs might only be willing to
proceed with a complaint if they have clear and convincing evidence of liability.
Such reasoning is compelling, but it is also analogous to the position in which
many defendants currently find themselves. It should be no surprise that many de-
fendants are unwilling to go to trial to vindicate themselves in a meritless lawsuit
where there is a chance that punitive damages will be imposed against them. In-
stead, defendants and their insurers are more likely to pay to settle meritless claims
in the absence of clear and convincing evidence exculpating the given defendant.
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General aviation manufacturers might also benefit from
reforming procedures that make it difficult to obtain relief
from frivolous suits as a matter of law prior to spending in-
ordinate amounts of money on pretrial discovery and ajury
trial.
I. MANDATORY INSURANCE
Among segments of the general aviation community, the
most controversial suggestion for tort reform is the require-
ment of mandatory insurance. 199 Quite frequenly, pilots
and mechanics are either undeiinsured or uninsured.20 0
When such individuals are involved in general aviation acci-
dents, the only remaining "pockets" to which plaintiffs may
look are those of the manufacturers. °1
Thus, in accidents plainly caused by pilot error or im-
proper maintenance, plaintiffs may go to great lengths to
place liability on manufacturers in hope of obtaining a re-
covery.202 Some manufacturers have suggested that if each
pilot and mechanic license holder were required to main-
tain minimum levels of insurance, as most motorists are re-
quired to do, the incentive for dragging manufacturers into
lawsuits regarding accidents obviously caused by pilots or
mechanics might gradually diminish. 0 3 Other segments of
the general aviation community, however, contend that
' See, e.g., Parr, supra note 79, at 25-31.
Id. at 29. A number of cases exist where a plane crashed because of improper
maintenance performed by uninsured mechanics. Id.
201 Id. at 26. Eighty-five percent of aircraft accidents relate to pilot error while
42.6% of aircraft accidents related to aircraft systems are the result of improper or
inadequate maintenance. Id. If plaintiffs could be paid by clearly liable parties, they
would have a reduced incentive to pursue products liability claims against manufac-
turers. Id.
Id. at 29. The theory and existence of liability may be secondary to placing an
insured defendant at risk of a jury trial. Id.
-3 Id. at 25-31. Glenn Parr, General Counsel for Piper Aircraft, suggests that
mandatory insurance would "deepen the pockets of those responsible for the vast
majority of aviation related injuries: negligent pilots and mechanics." Id. at 26. Parr
predicts that "a reasonable level of mandatory liability insurance will greatly reduce
the number of frivolous or nuisance cases against general aviation manufacturers
which, regardless of their merit or the amount of provable damages, are expensive
to defend and insure against." Id. at 28.
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such a requirement would serve only to increase the
skyrocketing costs of involvement in general aviation and
provide further fuel to a perceived plaintiff's feeding
frenzy.2 0 4
V. CONCLUSION
Tort judgments currently threaten many sectors of the
American economy, yet a consensus on any meaningful
comprehensive tort reform may be difficult to achieve in
the near future. The general aviation industry presents a
unique opportunity to experiment with various tort reform
concepts and objectively evaluate how successful each will
be. Effective tort reform concepts may then be expanded
to benefit greater portions of the economy and, if decisive
action is taken quickly, the general aviation industry might
be saved in the process.
See Parr, supra note 79, at 29-31. Parr notes that the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association has reacted negatively to the mandatory insurance proposal. Much of
the overwhelming support for tort reform found among general aviation consumers
may be attributable to the incredible products liability pass through costs reflected
in virtually every expense related to participation in general aviation. While
mandatory insurance may reverse this trend and eventually alleviate some of these
passed through costs, it is not surprising that many general aviation consumers
might view mandatory insurance as just one more cost that renders the overall ex-
pense of general aviation prohibitive.
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APPENDIX 1
THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT OF 1994
SEC. #1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "General Aviation Revitaliza-
tion Act of 1994".
SEC. #2. TIME LIMITATIONS ON CIVIL ACTIONS
AGAINST AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURERS.
(a) IN GENERAL - Except as provided in subsection
(b), no civil action for damages or injury to persons or dam-
age to property arising out of an accident involving a gen-
eral aviation aircraft may be brought against the
manufacturer of the aircraft or the manufacturer of any
new component, system, subassembly, or other part of the
aircraft, in its capacity as a manufacturer if the accident oc-
curred-
(1) after the applicable limitation period beginning on-
(A) the date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchase
or lessee, if delivered directly from the manufacturer, or
(B) the date of first delivery of the aircraft to a person
engaged in the business of selling or leasing such aircraft, or
(2) with respect to any new component, system, subassem-
bly, or other part which replaced another component, sys-
tem, subassembly, or other part originally in, or which was
added to the aircraft, and which is alleged to have caused
such death, injury, or damage, after the applicable limita-
tion period beginning on the date of competition of the re-
placement or addition.
(b) EXCEPTIONS - Subsection (a) does not apply-
(1) if the claimant pleads with specificity the facts neces-
sary to prove, and proves, that the manufacturer with re-
spect to the type certificate or airworthiness certificate for,
or obligations with respect to continuing airworthiness of,
an aircraft or a component, system, subassembly, or other
part of an aircraft knowingly misrepresented to the Federal
Aviation Administration, or concealed or withheld from the
Federal Aviation Administration, required information that
572
1994-1995] TORT REFORM
is material and relevant to the performance or the mainte-
nance or operation of such aircraft, or the component, sys-
tem, subassembly, or other part, that is causally related to
the harm which the claimant allegedly suffered;
(2) if the person for whose injury or death the claim is
being made is a passenger for purposes of receiving treat-
ment for a medical or other emergency;
(3) if the person for whose injury or death the claim is
being made was not aboard the aircraft at the time of the
accident; or
(4) to an action brought under a written warranty en-
forceable under law but for the operation of this Act.
(c) GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT DEFINED - For
the purposes of this Act, the term "general aviation aircraft"
means any aircraft for which a type certificate or an airwor-
thiness certificate has been issued by the Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration, which, at the time
such certificate was originally issues, had a maximum seat-
ing capacity of fewer than 20 passengers, and which was
not, at the time of the accident, engaged in scheduled pas-
senger-carrying operations as defined under regulations in
effect under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C.
App. 1301 et seq.) at the time of the accident.
(d) RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWS - This section
supersedes any State law to the extent that such law permits
a civil action described in subsection (a) to be brought after
the applicable limitation period for such civil action estab-
lished by subsection (a).
SEC. #3. OTHER DEFINITIONS.
For purposes of this Act-
(1) the term "aircraft" has the meaning given such term
in section 101(5) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49
U.S.C. 1301(5));
(2) the term "airworthiness certificate" means an airwor-
thiness certificate issued under section 603(c) of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1423(C)) or under any
predecessor Federal statutes;
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(3) the term "limitation period" means 18 years with re-
spect to general aviation aircraft and the components, sys-
tems, subassemblies, and other parts of such aircraft; and
(4) the term "type certificate" means a type certificate is-
sued under section 603(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (49 U.S.C. 1423(a)) or under any predecessor Federal
statute.
SEC. #4. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF ACT.
(a) EFFECTIVE DATE - Except as provided in subjec-
tion (b), this Act shall take effect on the date of the enact-
ment of this Act.
(b) APPLICATION OF ACT - This Act shall not apply
with respect to civil actions commenced before the date of
the enactment of this Act.
